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12 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: I&W Working Group Members

SUBJECT : Next Meeting

1. Herewith a revised draft as promised at our last meeting. It replaces Paragraphs 26 to 29 of the 5 June draft. For our meeting tomorrow (1330 in 7F17; please note changed time), I would like to review this, and I may have a few additional points in the revised final text to discuss before it goes to press. Finally, I still hope that the graphics Muse will smile on us. If she hasn't, we will have to discuss that.

2. Following this meeting the text will be locked up and with luck delivered to Mr. Bowie and [] early next week. The DDCI will be out of town this weekend and next.

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3. I would hope that we can complete our business by 2:20 pm, thereby allowing attendance at Dr. Reischauer's lecture.

[]

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Richard Lehman
AD/NFAC/SS

Attachment

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A. Permanent Management Arrangements

26. There is no better presentation of the theme of this section than the language of the HPSCI, which is here quoted:

"The Committee finds that effective warning at the national level required drawing on the full resources of the Intelligence Community to produce its best judgment on a situation that may require decision. That judgment must be presented in a sufficiently authoritative form to be heard clearly, without suppressing views into a bland consensus. The Committee has encountered concern -- particularly in those elements of the Intelligence Community involved in indications and warning -- over the absence of a point of accountability for warning. The Committee considers these concerns well founded. The DCI must establish a clearer focus for warning. It is recommended this be accomplished by creating a full-time position with the following responsibilities:

(1) Provide the DCI with the judgments of all the Intelligence Community's organizations on a situation that any one of them judges to be serious enough to receive the attention of top decision makers.

(2) Ensure timely formation of interagency working groups to monitor emerging situations

and form interagency crisis management groups as necessary;

(3) Oversee the Strategic Warning Staff and enable it to play a less detached role.

(4) Promote essential exchange of information between intelligence and operations or policy elements, and manage the selection and adoption of interagency conferencing systems and alerting procedures.

"The Committee recognizes that the necessary focus for warning cannot be achieved entirely by organizational means; equally important is the attitude displayed toward warning by intelligence management and analysts as well as by the user. [Emphasis added.]"

"Certain of the proposed functions outlined are now performed, but on an informal or ad hoc basis. The Committee asks that the DCI establish a clear focus of responsibility for warning and report to this Committee by August 1, 1978 on what actions have been taken."

26. As noted by the HPSCI, there is no point of focus at the national level. The only existing channel is through the "Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning," supposedly a senior DIA officer. This position is vacant, and an arrangement that puts so important a DCI responsibility on an officer not directly subordinate to him is intrinsically unsatisfactory, regardless of the cooperation and effectiveness of the incumbent. In the absence of a command structure, departmental efforts in the warning field are going forward without full integration into a coherent national effort.

There is no link between the DCI and NFIB and the various Community efforts. More important, there is no manifest indication that Community or CIA management takes seriously their ^{specific} responsibility for warning and communicates it downwards to the troops. *Consider the Department of Defense*

The Problem of Accountability

28. HPSCI calls for creation of a full-time officer with certain duties, who is to be by implication "a point of accountability" for warning. We see no objection to creation of a position with duties roughly corresponding to those suggested by the Committee -- and indeed recommend one below (paras ~~33-38~~) -- but we disagree that a staff officer with these duties can be "accountable" for warning. As we emphasized throughout, warning is an integral and primary responsibility of all intelligence organizations, whether engaged in collection or production, and hence of all analysts and ~~a~~ collection officers and managers at all echelons. Accountability for warning cannot somehow be divorced from accountability for assessment and estimating, from research and file-building, from current analysis and reporting. Nor should any officer in the Community be permitted the luxury of believing that he is free from this responsibility. Pearl Harbor remains the alpha and potential omega for American intelligence.

29. How then to provide accountability, to bring the threads of line responsibility in the Community and Agency together? They obviously center in the DCI, but the problem is to support him, to find a point of focus under him. Within the Community, this involves all the major agencies; within the Director's own domain it involves NFAC and CTS as major players, and other organizations as well.

29.
30. We believe the DCI needs a clearly defined and specialized structure leading down from him to the Community and Agency, using as much as possible existing organization⁵ and preserving line responsibility. We believe the threads should be brought together in the DDCI. Only ^{the DDCI} he is at the point where they naturally converge and thus can preserve the true chain of accountability, both for Community and Agency. Moreover, his appointment by the DCI as his overseer for warning and crisis would reaffirm the importance attached to this function, however much it tends to ^{be subordinated} disappear under more ^{pressing} mundane day-to-day concerns. (There is ample precedent for this in the appointments of DDCI's Cabell, Carter, Taylor, and Cushman to the Chairmanship of the Watch Committee.)

30. The DDCI would thus have new and important responsibilities. It is unrealistic, however, to believe that he can or should devote a major part of his time to these responsibilities, or exercise day-to-day operational control. Rather, his designation would symbolize the DCI's recognition of a critical responsibility^{and} at the same time ease some difficult management problems. We propose in subsequent paragraphs a substructure designed to free him of necessity for daily involvement, while preserving his ability to oversee and to intervene.

An Interagency Committee

31. The now missing linkage between the DCI and Community warning and crisis activities should be provided by a permanent committee constituted to balance the DoD and DCI interests and to coordinate collection and production. It should be chaired by the DDCI and include DD/NFA, DD/CT, DD/RM,

D/DIA, D/NSA, D/INR, and an OSD representative. Committees at this level always need working groups to do their business; we assume this one will need one or more as well.

32. Our reference to the Watch Committee does not mean that this new Committee should have substantive responsibilities. Rather we see it as the chairman's mechanism for exercising supervision over Community arrangements and procedures for crisis and warning, for management of the Community's "steady-state" warning operations, for assuring that the transition to emergency and crisis takes place smoothly, and for seeking improvements in all. It will oversee such enterprises as WISP and direct studies of promising new sources of warning. It could serve as a court of appeal for agencies that feel critical situations have not been given adequate emphasis. In these cases it would trespass on the substantive, but only ad hoc; it would not be in the intelligence production business as the Watch Committee was.